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Abstract
This paper examines the existing corporate governance environment, practices, and institutional
framework in Sri Lanka and evaluates their effectiveness to identify current issues and challenges. Sri
Lanka is an emerging and rapidly growing market economy in South Asia with a liberalised economic and
trade policies associated with FDI, international trade, and export-led development policies. Sri Lanka's
corporate governance (CG) systems and practices have been largely influenced by both colonial
economic policies and post-independence govt policies. Its CG practices consists of promoting dispersed
ownerships, increasing size of a board and decreasing directorship per director, greater involvement of
internationally recognized few audit firms in accounting and auditing functions, professional orientations
of company secretariat services. The provisions of Companies Act, the role of Securities and Exchange
Commission, professional accounting and auditing institutions, Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the
country's regularity environment play a significant role in the implementation of CG systems in the
country. With the rapid expansion of the corporate sector in recent years, there is need for improving the
current regularity mechanism in the country. The paper addresses the issue of whether the current
governance mechanisms in Sri Lanka are adequate to respond to the needs of the fast changing business
environment in Sri Lanka and to face the challenges posed by the changing domestic and global
corporate environment.
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Abstract
This paper examines the existing corporate governance environment, practices, and institutional
framework in Sri Lanka and evaluates their effectiveness to identify current issues and
challenges. Sri Lanka is an emerging and rapidly growing market economy in South Asia with a
liberalised economic and trade policies associated with FDI, international trade, and export-led
development policies. Sri Lanka’s corporate governance (CG) systems and practices have been
largely influenced by both colonial economic policies and post-independence govt policies. Its
CG practices consists of promoting dispersed ownerships, increasing size of a board and
decreasing directorship per director, greater involvement of internationally recognized few audit
firms in accounting and auditing functions, professional orientations of company secretariat
services. The provisions of Companies Act, the role of Securities and Exchange Commission,
professional accounting and auditing institutions, Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the country’s
regularity environment play a significant role in the implementation of CG systems in the
country. With the rapid expansion of the corporate sector in recent years, there is need for
improving the current regularity mechanism in the country. The paper addresses the issue of
whether the current governance mechanisms in Sri Lanka are adequate to respond to the needs
of the fast changing business environment in Sri Lanka and to face the challenges posed by the
changing domestic and global corporate environment.

97

Eighth International GABER Conference Proceedings, Deember 2011

*Corresponding author: Email—anura@uow.edu.au

98

Dubai, UAE

Eighth International GABER Conference Proceedings, Deember 2011

Dubai, UAE

Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka: the status Quo
1. Introduction
The primary objective of this paper is to present an overview of the corporate governance
mechanism in Sri Lanka and to discuss its recent developments together with the issues and
challenges that the policy makers are confronted with in improving the current system. The paper
is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a historical background of the CG practices in Sri
Lanka; section 3 highlights recent trends; section 4 outlines the legal and regulatory framework;
section 5 evaluates the effectiveness of the CG practises; section 6 presents the issues and
challenges and; section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Historical background
Sri Lanka, which was known as Ceylon, is an emerging economy in South Asia with a relatively
small population of 20 million and a fast developing economy in the region. Since the end of
prolong civil war in 2009, Sri Lanka’s economy has been growing at an average growth rate of
5.3%. Its economy has been very resilient to both internal and external shocks over the last two
decades. Socially, Sri Lanka’s has achieved human development outcomes more consistent with
those of high income countries (The World Bank, 2010). In recent years, the country has
implemented many economic reforms, most prominently in trade, taxation, privatization, and
enhancing the flexibility of the labour market. With the steady expansion of business sector in
Sri Lanka, there has been increasing interest in corporate governance practice in Sri Lanka.
There has been lack of studies examining corporate governance experiences in emerging
countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Monks and Minow, 2004). Monks and Minow (2004)
point out the significance of the emerging market economies in an inter-dependent world and in
the context of the flow of international capital across the borders. However, Herrigel (2006)
notes that the history of corporate governance arrangements, which has been understood as the
constitutive processes shaping the relationship between ownership and management of
enterprises, is a relatively new field of inquiry for business historians.
Sri Lanka was under number of colonial masters since 1505 until it gained political
independence in 1948 from the British rule which was the longest period in its colonial rule
(1815-1948). Under the colonial rule, some form of formation of the capital market development
was initiated. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that the colonial economic policy
had two strategic approaches in dealing with the colonies. Which policy was to be suitable for a
particular colony was decided by the mortality rate of the colonisers, traders and missionaries.
Accordingly, if the mortality rate among them was low, then they moved to a colony and decided
to settle down. Subsequently, they developed the property rights as they enjoyed in their parent
countries, which constitutes the common law by British and civil law by French. Australia, New
Zealand, and the US were chosen by the British colonisers as conducive for settlement as the
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colonizers experienced less mortality. Therefore, the systems of law prevailed in Britain was
developed in these countries as well.
Among the colonies, which had higher mortality rate but with natural endowments such
as minerals, fertile land and weather for crops, such endowed colonies were used for the
development of the parent country by exploiting to the maximum (Acemoglu and Johnson,
2005). Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2003) argue that in an extractive environment,
colonisers did not construct institutions that favour the development of competitive markets as
the colonizers believed that the competitive markets could threaten the position of the extraction.
Sri Lanka and India were attractive for geo-political strategic reasons. British naval forces could
control the entire Indian Ocean with the natural harbours. As a result, they developed the
common law but not to the full extent required to development of a capital market as in Australia
and New Zealand (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Morgan (1958) argues that Sri
Lanka was a classic example for extraction of its resources with the least development of capital
market and its constitutive processes such as the property law and civil law. Nevertheless, the
following milestones are important in the development of corporate governance practices in Sri
Lanka.
Introduction of Property Right Law in 1832
In the nineteenth centaury, the government took title to wide areas of uncultivated hill
land in Central Ceylon and sold them to British planters. The Waste Land Act of 1832 was
implemented by the colonial government and accordingly Ceylonese who could not claim for
land by documentary evidence lost the possession of their lands. These lands were sold to British
planters and to civil servants subsequently at cheaper prices (Ceylon Banking Commission,
1934). Although countries differ in the extent to which their legal system define and protect
property right, this act provided the legal basis for an individual or business to hold a legal title
for a resource that it owns.
Facilitating Capital Formation and the Establishment of Colombo Share Brokers Association
in 1896
In order to find large scale capital for the plantation industry, the Colombo Share Brokers
Association was established in 1896 (CSE, 2004). Plantation sector companies were the most
significant in the corporate sector in the economy till mid 1970s in terms of creating employment
opportunities and earning vital foreign exchange earnings (Commission of Inquiry on Agency
Houses and Brokering Firms, 1975; Moore, 1997).
Substandard Growth in Capital market in Sri Lankan until 1990s
There has been substandard growth in the capital market until 1990s mainly due to
colonial economic policies and repeated turnaround economic policies of post independent
governments. Lakshman (1985) argues that the colonial government did not produce the
necessary conditions for an organic development of capitalism on a wide front as the surpluses
generated in the plantation sector was sent to Great Britain leaving very little for further
accumulation in the domestic economy. Moore (1997) reports that some British firms engaged in
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tea auctions, both as buyers and sellers, undercut the prices and controlled almost everything
from plantation to retail trade. This has happened not only in Sri Lanka but also in India as
British planters own the industry (Tharian, 1984). As such, Tharian (1984) noted that the British
planters and the owners of the plantation companies repatriated under invoiced profits.
Researchers point out that even after post independent era beginning in 1948 until 1970s, several
factors inhibited the development of a conducive environment for the growth of the corporate
sector (Lakshman, 1985; Oberst, 1985; Snodgrass, 1998). First, the assistance programs of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had no serious involvement to develop the
capital market (Lakshman, 1985). Second factor is the ‘Westernized elite’s continued domination
of power’ (Oberst, 1985:760) and acceptance of economic models of the developed countries by
the policy planners either due to the privileges they enjoyed such as scholarships and other key
posts in some government organisations (Goonetilake, 1975).
Apart from the above factors, Sri Lanka has experienced ‘repeated turnarounds in
economic policy’ (Snodgrass, 1998:1). Governments in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s spent large
sums of money on social welfare programs and in state economic activities (Blackton, 1983). La
Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) argue that in heterogeneous societies such as in Sri Lanka,
governments are compelled to intervene in economic activities in order to pacify the diverse
interests of a heterogeneous society. The inability of the country to make a coherent economic
policy prescription conducive to economic growth and development was caused by different
political ideologies of each government which came to power unseating the incumbent
government in each general election since its independence in 1948 (Snodgrass, 1998). In this
sense, Nithiyanandam (2000, P. 284) notes that Sri Lanka was an ‘Economic Laboratory’.
Growth of capital market after 1990s
The slow growth scenario noted above changed dramatically since mid 1980s. Moore
(1997) points out that many changes in the international environment such as the liberalisation of
economies world wide and competition for foreign equity flows and FDI among developing
countries led to a common understanding among mainstream national political parties in the
country with regard to the need of having a coherent economic policies based on market
principles. Moore (1997) notes that the Colombo Share Market was also successful in attracting
investment as he observed that, for the first time ever, the stock market became the largest single
source of new capital for the private sector’ in 1994 (Moore, 1997:360).
3. Recent Trends
Increased recognition and involvement in capital market and promoting dispersed ownership.
The number of listed firms has grown from 141 in 1977 to 250 in 2011, showing an
increase of 77 per cent in this period. This shows that many companies which have been
registered prior to 1977 have sought equity capital. In 2002, the Government of Sri Lanka gave
the non-nationals the permission to buy shares to the full value of issued capital of a listed
company either through approved country funds, regional funds, and corporate bodies or as
individuals subject to some exclusions and limitations. Due to these new measures taken, many
of the established firms seized the opportunities to get listed and also were successful in
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mobilising equity capital (Samarakoon, 1999). Table 1shows that there is a dispersed ownership
as well as large ownership of shares as in the case of other markets in both developed and
emerging countries(La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). For example, a large number of
shareholders holds less than 1,000 shares by each (86.7 percent of total shareholders) and a few
numbers of large shareholders.
Dispersed share ownership results in poor involvement in corporate governance as found
in many developed capital markets (Stratling, 2003; Monks and Minow, 2004). Due to dispersion
of risks across a section of stocks (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and due to various commitments,
individual investors are not keen in corporate governance as witnessed by poor attendance for
annual general meetings in the capital markets (Davies, 2003). On the other hand, large scale
ownership has resulted in reducing agency conflicts and inevitably neglecting the interest of the
minor shareholders (La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens and Pan, 2002).
Table 1
Size distribution of Shareholdings among the Shareholders (174 companies)
Percentage of total*
Number of shares owned
Number of shareholders
Less than 1,000
524,530
86.7
1,001 – 5,000
53,521
8.8
5,001 – 10,000
13,042
2.2
10,001 – 50,000
10,021
1.7
50,001 – 1,000,000
3,183
0.5
Over 1 million
589
0.1
604,886
100
Total
Source: Survey data compiled using Handbook of Listed Companies, Colombo Stock Exchange

Increasing size of a Board and Decreasing Directorship per Director
There are several noteworthy features in relation to the directorships of listed companies,
as shown in Table 2. First, the average size of a board or the number of directorships in a quoted
company has increased from 3.8 in 1951 to 5.4 in 1971 and 7.2 in 2004. Second, the average
number of directorships per director has gradually decreased since 1951 to 2004 from 2.8 to 1.5
respectively. Number of directors holding only one directorship also has increased from 56 in
1951 to 76 in 2004. Number of directors who hold multiple numbers of directorships (more than
10 directorships) has been gradually decreasing from 14 in 1951 to 8 in 2004. Cosh and Hughes
(1987) find similar characteristics in relation to the directorship in large UK and US public
companies.
Table 2
Distribution of Directorships of Quoted Companies, 1951, 1971, 1988 and 2004
Number of quoted companies
Total number of company directorships
Average number of directorships per company
Average number of directorships per director
Percent of directors holding only 1 directorship
Number of directors holding 10 or more directorships
Percent of directorships held by persons holding 10 or more

102

1951
189
718
3.8
2.8
55
14
22

1971
153
824
5.4
2.2
67
12
17

1988
176
1256
7.1
1.6
75
4
4

2004
243
1766
7.2
1.5
76
8
.06
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directorships
Source: Compiled data from Moore (1997:353) and Handbook of Listed Companies, CSE.

Greater involvement of internationally recognized few large Audit firms
The financial statements of listed firms are audited by audit firms registered in Sri Lanka.
Some of them are the branches of international audit firms. Table 3 shows that 90 percent of
companies are audited by three international audit firms namely, KPMG, Ernest and Young, and
Price Waterhouse Coopers. However, the lack of the presence of Deloitte Audit firm in Sri
Lanka is also evident. The number of companies audited by them in 2004 is 98, 70 and 22
respectively (Table 3). There is also a number of Sri Lankan audit firms among which, three
firms (HLB Edirisinghe, Kreston M N S and Ford Rhodes Thornton) performed audit of 17
companies. Small companies in terms of turnover and assets are usually audited by individual
audit firms. Some authors argue that when the auditing is done by an international audit firm,
better corporate transparency could be expected (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2004).
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Table3
Concentration of Auditing of Corporate Sector
Name of the audit firm
KPMG
Ernst and Young
PriceWaterhouse Coopers
HLB Edirisinghe & Co
Kreston M N S & Co
Ford Rhodes Thornton
Each auditor having three firms
Each auditor having two firms
Single auditors each having one firm
Total number of firms

No of firms
98
70
22
7
6
4
12
8
12
239

Source: Handbook of Listed Companies 2004, Colombo Stock Exchange

Professional Orientation of Company Secretariat services
A governance role that is changing in significant ways is that of the company secretary
(Style, 2001). Although the role is less important in smaller companies, it is becoming more
important in larger organisations where the company secretary is increasingly charged with
ensuring good governance and compliance (Nicholson and Kiel (2004). They, however, note that
the significance of a company’s secretary’s role in CG has not been researched adequately.
Similarly, the issue of whether the secretariat function is needed by the small firms has not been
empirically examined. Company Acts in the UK (sections 272 to 279 in 2006 Companies Act)
and Sri Lanka (sections 221 and 222 in Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007) indicate various aspects
of the company secretary such as the appointment, duties and qualifications.
There are two types of company secretaries in Sri Lankan companies.
(1)Legal and accountancy firms functioning as company secretaries. They provide other
services such as legal consultancy and accounting
(2)Individual secretaries mainly consist of lawyers and chartered accountants.
Among the legal and accountancy firms which function as company secretaries, one firm
serves 16 companies on average, while the majority of the companies in the corporate sector are
served by individual secretaries (number of firms 52) (see Table- 4). Company secretarial
function is considered as a vital element in linking the shareholders with the management and
the board of a company (Companies Act, 2006). Therefore, it is required to pay attention to the
argument of Nicholson and Kiel (2004) who point out the lack of studies on this vital function
and the need for research.
Table 4
Concentration of Corporate Secretarial Function
Number of listed firms

No of secretarial firms

104

Number of individual
secretaries

Total

Eighth International GABER Conference Proceedings, Deember 2011

Dubai, UAE

1 firm
16
52
2 firms
6
5
3 firms
8
0
4 firms
4
0
5 – 10 firms
6
0
11 – 15 firms
4
0
16 – 20 firms
1
0
45
57
Total
Source: Handbook of Listed Companies 2004, Colombo Stock Exchange

68
11
8
4
6
4
1
102

4. Legal and regulatory framework
Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007
The Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 is the most significant regulation governing companies in Sri
Lanka. This Act replaces the existing Companies Act No. 17 of 1982 which was based on the
English Companies Act of 1948. The new Act was necessary to respond to the significant
increase in commercial and economic activities in the country and its capital and financial
markets in 1980s and 1990s. The new Act moved away from traditional method of adopting UK
laws and introduced features of company law in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.
The new Company Act protects the interests of the shareholders and the other
stakeholders including directors and managers in many ways. Shareholders have wider powers
which they did not have in the 1982 Company Act. Shareholders and co-directors can sue the
directors if they fail to exercise due care and diligence in business judgement. However, general
duties of the directors are mentioned in the Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 in Sri Lanka as in the
Companies Act of 2006 in the UK (section 171 to 177), which includes serving the company
within the powers, promoting the business, and exercising reasonable judgment and care.
However, corporations can decide what type of specific tasks the directors have to take in
relation to the business activities.
The new Act also gives power to the shareholders and directors to initiate derivative law
suit actions (section 234-237). This is a new feature which was not available in the Company Act
of 1982. Derivative law suit against the company is a right of the shareholders and the directors
in many countries such as the US and the UK. However, according this section, the court has the
right to decide to proceed or discontinue the proceedings. In the case of derivative suit actions,
the company has to bear the cost of proceeding. At the same time, if the shareholders make false
claims and if it is proven by the management in the Commercial Court, they could be made liable
and could be prevented attending the subsequent shareholders’ meetings too.
Another significant development in the new Act is that the minority shareholders are
given the right to ask the company to buy-back the shares if they think some actions or decisions
of the company would damage their interests. Major transactions such as amalgamation with
another company, reduction of share capital which could affect the debt equity balance, change
of the name of the company and status of the company are such situations (section 92(1) of the
Companies Act of 2007). In such situations, the company has the obligation to meet certain
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conditions such as decisions on a fair and reasonable price and giving time to express objections
by any disaffected shareholders (section 95 of the Companies Act of 2007). However, the
Companies Act of 2007 has many checks and balances in the process of the buy-backs such as
checking source of financing of buy-backs. According to the section 99, these actions should not
contravene the rights of the shareholders.
Directors of public companies are required to meet several criteria before they are
appointed to the board of a public company. They include the upper age limits, declaration of the
qualifications, declarations of the interest of the directors, re-election, removal, remuneration and
restrictions on loans to directors. These criteria could be useful to the shareholders and other
stakeholders to see that the directors have behaviour acceptable to them (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Accordingly, some of the decisions of the directors such as the amalgamation, winding up and
compromises with creditors are required to obtain special approval of the shareholders at an
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. However, the Act provides with directors the right to take
indemnity and insurance cover. This shows evidence to suggest that the liability of directors is
minimised in Sri Lanka too as found in many other countries by Cheffins and Black (2006).
Legal provisions relating to insolvency laws in the country are an area to be developed
further (Batra, 2006). In the new Act, there is special attention for the issues arising from
winding up of a company due to bankruptcy (section 270 to 284 of the new Act). For example, in
such satiations, the Act suggests, the appointment of the liquidator and administrator to protect
the interest of all the stakeholders.
Professionals Accounting and Auditing Institutions and Standards
Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of 1995 provides for the formulation
and statutory recognition of Sri Lanka accounting standards and Sri Lanka auditing standards. A
monitoring body (SLAASMB) has been set up under this in order to oversee the implementation
of the above standards. Among the corporate governance problems widely discussed in literature
are the accounting and auditing frauds, discussed as problems of earnings management (Healy
and Wahlen, 1999; Leuz, Nanada and Wysocki, 2003; Davidson, Stewart and Kent, 2005).
Setting the accounting and auditing standards, implementation and monitoring of the practice are
vital aspects in preventing earnings management. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri
Lanka (ICASL) is responsible for the adoption of the accounting and auditing standards. ICASL
is a member of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the International
Standards of International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC).
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)
While the Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007 provides the regulations necessary for the protection of
the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders including debtors, the SEC (established
by the Securities Council Act No. 36 of 1987) has been granted the power to regulate the conduct
of the security market in Sri Lanka. The SEC is the sole authority which can issue license to
operate a stock exchange, appointment of stock brokers and dealers. In order to regulate the
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growing number of institutions such as the Unit Trusts, credit rating agencies and underwriters in
the financial industry in Sri Lanka since early 1980s, the Securities Council Act No. 36 of 1987
has been revised in 1991 and replaced in 2003 by the new Securities Council Act, No. 18 of
2003. Objects of the SEC are: (1) the creation and maintenance of a market in which securities
can be issued and traded in an orderly manner; (2) protection of the interests of investors; (3)
operation of a compensation fund to protect investors from financial loss arising from any
licensed stock broker or licensed stock dealer being found of not meeting his contractual
obligations; and (4) regulation of the securities market and to ensure that professional standards
are maintained in such market. Among the investor protection activities, the SEC ensures the
compliance of firms to the regulations and prevention of insider trading activities. Listed
companies are also required to submit the annual reports within a six months period of the close
of the financial year and SEC pays attention for the disclosure level and the quality of financial
and non financial information.
Regulation of Listed Firms in the Financial Sector
Boards of listed firms in the financial sector (commercial banks, merchant banks, finance
companies, leasing companies, insurance companies, and long term credit institutions) come
under twin control; that is the Registrar of Companies and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka
(CBSL). Registrar of Companies in Sri Lanka has the statutory power of verification of the assets
and liabilities of listed firms irrespective of the nature of the business. The Monetary Law Act
No. 32 in 2002, Sri Lanka insists that the CBSL has the power to verify the assets and liabilities
and general business activities of listed firms in the financial industry. Regulatory framework for
the commercial banks are relatively more striker than the others in the financial industry as the
commercial banks are required to comply with some international regulations such as the capital
adequacy regulations (Basle Accord) of the International Bank for Settlements. The boards of
listed long-term credit institutions in the country (Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon,
National Development Bank, Housing Development Corporation of Sri Lanka), come under the
respective act of incorporation and some influence from the providers of long term capital such
as International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank (World Bank, 2007).
However, in the case of these long term credit institutions which were established by the Acts of
the Parliament, the ultimate power rests with the parliament. Despite the ownership of
shareholders both public and institutional, they have no special power to control or to appoint the
boards for these institutions. This is a special situation in relation to the shareholder interests
(World Bank, 2007).
Finance Companies Act of 1998
Among other public quoted companies in the financial industry, finance companies,
insurance companies, leasing companies, mutual funds and unit trusts play a significant role in
the economy (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2006). Finance companies are required to get
registered under the Finance Companies Act, No 78 of 1988. Before 1988, finance companies
were regulated under the Finance Companies Act No 27 of 1979, which was Insufficient to
effectively supervise and regulate finance companies’ (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004:25). The
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boards of many of the failed finance companies were responsible for the mismanagement of
portfolio, corruption and lack of skills, which resulted in huge losses for the depositors and the
tax payers (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004). Of the 72 finance companies, which were
operating before the enactment of the Finance Companies Act in 1988, only 25 could be able to
register under the new Act (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004).
In order to operate a finance company in Sri Lanka, Finance Companies Act, No 78 of
1988 emphasises the need to meet the following criteria: (1) minimum amount of capital
requirement to be maintained; (2) maximum amount of share, an individual could have in the
issued capital; (3) personal responsibility of the directors for the operations, and (4) submission
of periodical reports to the CBSL. As a result of these strict regulations, confidence of the
general public was restored in the finance companies as evidently shown in the growth of the
finance companies in the later years (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004).
Insurance Industry Act of 2000
The insurance industry is one of the highly regulated sectors in the country. Regulation of
Insurance Industry Act, No. 30 of 2000 has created the Insurance Board of Sri Lanka (IBSL). To
operate insurance business in Sri Lanka, companies are required to get a licence from the IBSL
(in addition to the incorporation complying the Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007), and are subject
to regulations and supervision of the IBSL. Insurance industry has not only statutory regulations
but also self regulations in the form of guidelines for better service to the customers. Insurance
Ombudsman is the non-regulatory body which has power to inquire into and settle any
complaints and disputes between individual customers and the insurance institutions.
The Fair Trading Commission Act of 1987
In order to protect the public interests from monopolies, mergers and anti-competitive
practices, Government of Sri Lanka has enacted the Fair Trading Commission in 1987 under the
Act of No.1of 1987. Section 11 of the Act specifies that a complaint of an existence of
monopoly, merger or anti-competition in the business sector, will get the attention of the
Commission to look into whether any of the above or all is detrimental to the general public of
the country. Accordingly, fixing a maximum price for a product or service, while protecting the
return on investments, is a key task of this Commission. Institute of Policy Studies (2002) points
out that the above Commission has investigated number of complaints of several listed
companies in the last few years with some decisions to penalise, while some claims have been
rejected. However, the lack of funds of this Commission prevents the proper administration of
the tasks of the Commission (Institute of Policy Studies, 2002). The above discussion reveals
that the public listed companies in Sri Lanka are subjected to a number of statutory regulations.
Therefore, what we see is that the economic enterprises are heavily regulated on the one
hand and the regulations are scattered across several institutions on the other. This situation has
been identified by Pierce and Waring (2004:333) as, ‘in Sri Lanka, there is a plethora of
regulations in many forms’. However, the selection of a regulatory system is a decision of the
society. Governor of the CBSL speaking on the regulatory system of the banking industry in Sri
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Lanka says that ‘one needs to be practical and sensible in deciding the appropriate system for its
financial services industry. The size of the country, the track record of supervisory authorities
and, more importantly, the close interaction between the supervisory authority and the
institutions to be supervised, are important considerations (Jayawardene, 2002).
5. Evaluating the effectiveness of CG mechanism
Unlike in the UK, regulatory impact assessment studies have not been undertaken in Sri Lanka
on a continuous basis (Institute of Policy Studies, 2005). Therefore, the effectiveness of the
regulations is discussed with the use of reports and literature available with the limitation of
having difficulties in seeing a holistic view of effectiveness.
According to Batra (2006), the Registrar of Companies in Sri Lanka works under limited
resources. Therefore, the Registrar of Companies faces difficulties in achieving a full
implementation of the overseeing responsibility, the state of compliance for the regulations on
the submission of annual reports and the nature of disclosures in particular. ‘The office of the
Registrar of Companies lacks the capacity to administer the official receivers and the liquidation
process. They are not exposed to any education and training and are not schooled in best
practices. However, ‘their integrity and independence are not in doubt’ (Batra, 2006:14).
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) argue that insider trading laws are not effective in the
emerging countries. La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (2006) have examined the security laws of
49 countries in which Sri Lanka has been included. These authors construct two indices namely
the Disclosure Index and the Liability Index to see the strength of the security laws in a country.
The disclosure index is computed by number of dimensions. They are: (1) the nature of
the prospectus in particularly the compliance of it in relation to legal provisions; (2)
compensation of directors and (3) shareholder structure and inside ownership. Liability index
comprises the ability of the investors to make a claim. Sri Lanka stands below the mean value of
the English origin countries in all the indices (Table 5).
Table 5
Sri Lanka – Indices of Regulation of Securities Markets
Mean Score
Sri Lanka

Disclosure requirements
Liability Standard
Supervisor characteristics
Rule making power
Investigative power
Orders
Criminal sanctions
Public enforcement

0.75
0.39
0.33
1.00
0.50
0.00
0.33
0.43
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Countries with
English Laws
applicable
0.78
0.58
0.48
0.67
0.75
0.57
0.65
0.62
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Source: La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (2006:15).

The first row shows the Sri Lanka situation and the second row shows the mean value for
the countries where English law prevails. However, the value for disclosure is 0.75 and it is close
to the mean value of 0.78. The value of regulations or the rule making power is 1.00 which is
above the mean value of 0.67.
There is also evidence to show that implementation of the regulations has been further
strengthened in recent years. In the annual report of the SEC (SEC, 2006), several cases of
misconduct of the directors are mentioned along with the actions taken by the SEC. Among them
is the selling of shares of family members of some directors at higher prices with the knowledge
of sensitive market information. Such declarations in the annual report of the SEC on the conduct
of the directors of the listed companies may deter the directors as violation of trading rules has
been occurred. However, there is no follow up research to identify its effect. Abeysekera (2001)
notes that SEC has made substantial progress to ensure market efficiency with ‘freely available
information, competition among investors and effective communication among market
participants’ (2001:251).
The responsibility and the emphasis of the auditors in Sri Lanka in early 1980s was to
ensure that the company management prepares annual reports to show that there is a true and fair
view of the accounts (Perera, 1980). Perera (1980:122) notes that ‘there has been not much
discussion in Sri Lanka on the rational behind annual reports and the information value of the
financial statements they generate’. This scenario has been improved gradually. For example, the
ICASL organises an annual competition to select the best annual report among the listed as well
as the unlisted corporate sector since 1964. Since 2000, this annual competition focuses on three
areas, namely, Good Corporate Governance Disclosure Award, Corporate Social Responsibility
Reporting, and Management Commentary Award. Further, there is evidence to suggest that the
authority is keen to see the implementation of the accounting and auditing standards.
Some international research studies find a better disclosure situation in Sri Lanka.
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) in their research on corporate transparency of 45 countries
selected during a period of five years from 1990 to 1995, points out that there are some
promising countries which can take up the challenge of developing corporate governance in par
with the developed countries and Sri Lanka is one of them. These authors have used a number of
variables, namely, financial disclosures (segments reporting, capital expenditure on research and
development and others, accounting policies, declaration about subsidiaries), governance
disclosure (size of major shareholders, management personnel, boards and their remuneration,
director and officer shareholdings), accounting principles, timeliness of disclosures, and
credibility of disclosures. According to their findings, the best disclosure of governance
information is found is Singapore (100 points) and next comes for Sri Lanka (97.83 points). UK
accounts for 94.57 points, while the US stands for only 75.72 points. In disclosure variables, the
UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Japan Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and
Switzerland are in equal footing (100 points) but the US is behind. Chairman of International
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Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has praised the standards of accounting disclosures in Sri
Lanka (Ceylon Daily News, 2005). Existence of number of regulatory bodies in Sri Lanka may a
possible factor for the high level of disclosure
Although Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) have not obtained the data on the number
of audit firms in Sri Lanka and on the strength of the audit function in the quoted companies in
Sri Lanka, 80 percent of the auditing of the corporate sector has been done by the internationally
recognized audit companies (Handbook of Listed Companies, 2004). According to Bushman,
Piotroski and Smith (2003:213), ‘…audit is a measure of the credibility of financial disclosures.
6. Issues and challenges of CG in Sri Lanka
Common CG issues range from a simple misuse of shareholders funds such as the employment
of a person not suitable for a job but known to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or spending to
beautify the office of the CEO more than the needed comforts to discharge the duties or pure
thefts and payment of salary and bonuses not commensurate with job performance etc. are
among a large number of ways of deviating the shareholders funds discussed across many
countries by the researchers (Berle and Means, 1933; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Leuz, Nanda and
Wysocki, 2003).
Similarly, in the recent past, a number of CG problems in Sri Lanka have been reported.
They include issues such as the collapse of number of finance companies in mid 1980s, and
misuse of funds of a private commercial bank and a finance company in mid 1990s and early
2000. However, the tax payers had to bear the minimum cost due to prompt action taken by the
Government and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2008).
The growth of the number of quoted companies since 1978 shows the emergence of wide
participation in the equity capital and the eventual and inevitable emergence of agency conflicts
(e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Although there is an international presence of audit firms, majority of the corporate sector
have not yet developed audit committees. In a survey done by the SEC to see the level of
establishment of audit committees, SEC found that only 62 percent of companies have
established audit committees (out of 132 companies responded to a survey of 239 companies as
at July 20, 2005) (SEC, 2005). This report shows many grey areas in audit related functions such
as the inclusion of the CEO and some other executives also in the audit committees. Pierce and
Waring (2004) find that the audit committees in the listed companies in Sri Lanka spend only
around 15 minutes together and in some occasions hardly any attendance by the full committee
members even.
Using data from the Worldwide Governance indicators for 2005, the World Bank (2006)
reports that democratic accountability and clean government go hand in hand’ (2006:7). The
politicians and the officers well understand the need to protect independence to develop free
trade but they do not allow the legal framework to establish its root (Irvin, 2001; La Porta et el.,
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2004). La Porta et el., (2004) find that politicians who get a rent from the business community
prevent competition in order to enjoy the privileges. Business firms get abnormal profit as a
result and they too make various barriers for the new firms to come.
Political interferences affect the implementation of the regulations in the country as found
by many authors. Thus, the protection of the interests of the shareholders and the other
stakeholders are at stake even though the regulatory framework is in force (Weerakoon, 1995;
Wickramasinghe, Hopper and Rathnasiri, 2004; Ratnayakara, 2006). Ratnayakara (2006, p.1)
referring to the political influences states;
“Despite all the rules and regulations protecting various stakeholders, we have seen
gross violations against the rights of minority shareholders as well as customers and
competitors in recent times by powerful individuals who are able to throw their weight
and flex their muscle in addition to dropping names thus instilling fear in the minds of
regulators, in resorting to the acts. Very often are powerful stakeholder infringes on the
rights of other stakeholders, competitors, employees, minority shareholders and even
the fellow directors”.

The freedom for entrepreneurs to establish business could be measured by several
indicators. Miles, Holms and O’Grady (2006) define economic freedom as ‘the absence of
government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and
services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself’ (Miles,
Holms and O’Grady, 2006:56). In order to measure economic freedom, these authors used fifty
economic variables categorising them into ten broad categories, i.e. trade policy, fiscal burden of
government, intervention of the government in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and
foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and
informal market activity. All of these variables are treated equally important. The overall
economic freedom score of a country is based on the simple average of ten individual factor
scores. The score for each factor varies from one to five. A score of one signifies an economic
environment or set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom, while a score of
five signifies a set of policies that are least conducive to economic freedom. Four broad
categories of economic freedom in the index are: Free (countries with an average overall score of
1.99 or less), Mostly free (countries with an average overall score of 2.00 to 2.99), mostly unfree (countries with an average overall score of 3.00 to 3.99) and repressed (countries with an
average overall score of 4.00 or higher). According to this index, Sri Lanka belongs to mostly
un-free category with a score of 3.19.

Economic and political freedom is two other significant factors which decide the state of
protection of rights of investors in a country (Reed, 2004). La Porta et al., (2004) measure
political freedom by several sources such as an index of political rights, democracy index, and
index of human rights (2004:452). Barro (1999) introduces an easy to understand measure of
political rights categorised into seven on the basis of the amount of electoral rights. Group one is
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the highest level of rights and groups seven is the lowest. Sri Lanka has been included in
between the democracy and dictatorship (Barro, 1999). Among many other factors, bureaucratic
inefficiency (Mauro, 1995) and poor enforcement of law (La Porta et el. 1999) result in creating
a large shadow economy, in developing countries including Sri Lanka (Schneider and Enste,
2000). These authors point out that the percentage of the shadow economy in Sri Lanka is around
38-50 percent. This is no doubt a very large drain of, otherwise the legitimate property of the
general public or the potential investors.
Filatotchev et al., (2007) identified the significance of the role of institutional investors as
a corporate governance mechanism. In a developing country like Sri Lanka, domestic
institutional investors could play a vital role in many forms in the capital market as pointed out
by Reisen (2000), i.e. by making information available, increasing market liquidity, lowering
transition costs, facilitating market participation by the general public, helping businesses raising
capital, making privatisation possible, playing a role in corporate monitoring and attracting
foreign investors. According to Pierce and Waring (2004), investor activism and stakeholder
activism is in increasing trend in Sri Lanka, although it is not sufficient.
7. Conclusion
The above discussion points out that Sri Lanka have a growing corporate sector and a large scale
regulatory framework established with the growth of the corporate sector since the introduction
of the free market policies in 1977. However, as Anand (2006) points out the balance of both
regulatory and non-regulatory codes on corporate governance brings harmony and less cost for
both companies and the regulators. The paper argues that statutory rules and regulations enforce
compliance cost for the companies and even could stifle the growth of the corporate sector
especially the firms seeking the equity capital. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2000 has discouraged some
firms to enter the equity market and also some firms now tend to go back to leveraged buy-outs
and privatise (Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Zhang, 2007).
The regulatory bodies also have to meet the cost of maintenance of office and a
professional staff to see that listed firms comply with the regulations (FSA, 2006). However, if
there are only non-regulatory codes on corporate governance, the investors have to bear the cost
of verifying the state of corporate governance in each and every firm they wish to invest (Anand,
2006). Investors are unable to find out the nature of corporate governance or about the true
nature of declarations in financial statements due to the lack of knowledge and resources
(Turnbull, 1997). Due to information barriers, the investors would not be able to get a correct
picture of the firms. Therefore, a balance of both statutory regulatory and non-regulatory codes
on corporate governance could be effective (Anand, 2006).
As indicated in the paper, there is a need for in depth studies examining the CG practices
in emerging economies and CG practices in these countries have not come under scrutiny. For
example, little is known about the appointment of non-executive directors, their sources of
origin, training, evaluation and their in comparisons to the situation in developed capital markets
(Higgs, 2003). The external corporate governance mechanisms too are not transparent enough
113

Eighth International GABER Conference Proceedings, Deember 2011

Dubai, UAE

and are not fully functional due to the smallness of the corporate sector. There have been few
corporate takeovers but the process and the outcome is not so transparent due to the involvement
of the politicians in the process. Researchers must come forward to develop a research agenda
especially in behavioural side of corporate governance in the country. This paper shed some light
in this regard.
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